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Abstract 
Considering a lead-time- and price-sensitive demand, we investigate whether a client rejection policy, 
modeled as M/M/1/K system, can be more profitable than an all-client acceptance policy, modeled as 
M/M/1 system. We provide analytical insights for the cases with and without holding and penalty costs by 
comparing M/M/1/1 to M/M/1 models. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The delivery lead-time, which represents the elapsed time between the placement of the order 
by the customer and the receipt of this order, has become a factor of competitiveness for companies 
and an important purchase criterion for many customers. Geary and Zonnenberg (2000) reported 
that top performers among 110 organizations conducted initiatives not only to reduce costs and 
maintain reliability, but also to improve delivery speed and flexibility. Baker et al. (2001) found 
that less than 10% of end consumers and less than 30% of corporate customers base their 
purchasing decisions on price only; for a substantial majority of purchasers both price and delivery 
lead time are crucial factors that determine their purchase decisions. Thus, in order to increase 
their profit, companies must not focus only on price but also need to quote the right delivery lead 
time to their customers. A short quoted lead time can lead to higher demand but can also result in 
late delivery, which affects the firm’s reputation for on-time delivery and deters future customers 
(Slotnick, 2014). In addition, companies risk to lose markets if they are not capable of respecting 
the quoted delivery lead-times (Kapuscinski and Tayur, 2007). A long quoted lead time can reduce 
the risk of late delivery but leads to lower demand. This raises the following relevant question: 
What is the best lead time that must be quoted by a company when customers are not only sensitive 
to price but also to lead time? Some authors tried to answer this question while considering an 
M/M/1 system (Palaka et al., 1998; Pekgün et al., 2008; So and Song, 1998). One of the 
characteristics of the M/M/1 is accepting all customers, which can lead to congestions in the queue. 
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In order to cope with this situation, firms can react by quoting longer lead times in order to maintain 
the desired service level. However, this leads to lower demand and revenue. Starting from this 
observation, we investigate in this paper whether a customer rejection policy can be more 
beneficial for the firm than an all-customers acceptance policy. Indeed, our idea is based on the 
fact that rejecting some customers might help to quote shorter lead time for the accepted customers, 
which might lead to higher demand and profit. We model this rejection policy based on an 
M/M/1/K system. We analytically determine the optimal firm’s policy (optimal price and quoted 
lead time) in case of M/M/1/1 system. Then, we compare the optimal firm’s profit under M/M/1/1 
with the optimal profit obtained by M/M/1. Two situations are considered: a system without 
holding and penalty costs and a system where these costs are included. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop the formulation 
of the M/M/1/K system with price-and lead-time-sensitive demand. Later, we analytically solve 
the M/M/1/K system for K=1 without holding and penalty cost and compare the results to those 
obtained with M/M/1. We then focus on the case with holding and penalty cost for the rest of the 
paper. We finally conclude and give future work directions. 
 
PROPOSED MODEL (THE M/M/1/K) 
 
As in Palaka et al. (1998), we consider a make-to-order firm where the capacity is assumed to 
be constant while price, quoted lead-time, and, consequently, demand are decision variables. 
Customers are served in first-come, first-served basis (FCFS). The arrival process is assumed to 
be a Poisson process. The processing times of customers in the system are assumed to be 
exponentially distributed. Contrary to the assumptions of M/M/1 model where all customers are 
accepted (as in Palaka et al., 1998 and Pekgun et al., 2008), we reject customers when we have 
already K customers in the system, therefore we model the system by an M/M/1/K. 
Similarly to Liu et al. (2007); Palaka et al. (1998); and Pekgün et al., (2008), the demand is 
assumed to be a linear decreasing function in price and quoted lead-time. 
 
  ,, 21 lbpbalp   (1) 
where: 
p  =  price of the good/service set by the firm, 
l  =  quoted lead-time, 
 lp,  =  expected demand for the good/service with price p and quoted lead-time l, 
a  = market potential,  
1b  =  price sensitivity of demand, 
2b  =  lead-time sensitivity of demand, 
 
Since the demand is downward sloping in both price and quoted lead-time, b1 and b2 are restricted 
to be non-negative  
According to Palaka et al. (1998), this linear demand function is tractable and has several 
desirable properties. For instance, with such a linear demand, the price elasticity is increasing in 
both price and quoted lead-time. Customers would be more sensitive to long lead-times when they 
are paying more for the goods or service. Similarly, customers would be more sensitive to high 
prices when they also have longer waiting times.  
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In order to prevent the firms from quoting unrealistically short lead-times, we assume that the 
firm maintains a certain minimum service level. The service level (s) is defined as the probability 
that the actual lead-time (W) satisfies the quoted lead-time (l) (P (W ≤ l) ≥ s).  
Since we assume an M/M/l/K queueing system with mean service rate, μ, mean arrival rate (or 
demand), λ, and throughput rate (effective demand),  , then the expected number of customers in 
the system is given by Ls (see eq. (2)), and the actual lead-time (time in the system) is exponentially 
distributed with mean sL (see eq. (3)). The probability that the firm is able to meet the quoted 
lead-time (P (W ≤ l)) and the probability that a job is late (P (W > l)) are given in eq. (4). These 
equations are based on Gross et al. (2008). 
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The objective of the firm is to maximize its revenue, which includes the following three parts: 
(1) Expected revenue (net of direct costs) is represented by  mp  , where m is the unit 
direct variable cost. 
(2) Total Congestion cost is expressed as the mean number of jobs in the system multiplied 
by the unit holding cost (Ls × F). This cost typically represents the in-process inventory 
holding cost.  
(3) Total Lateness penalty cost is expressed as (penalty per job per unit lateness) × (number 
of overdue clients) × (expected lateness given that a job is late). The number of overdue 
clients is equal to: (throughput rate) × (probability that a job is late). The penalty cost per 
job per unit lateness (denoted by c) reflects the direct compensation paid to customers for 
not meeting the quoted lead-time. Mathematically, this total Lateness penalty cost is given 
by   WlWPc  . 
Thus, the firm’s optimization problem can be formulated as follows: 
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 0,,,  lp  (11) 
 
where, 
Decision Variables Parameters 
p  = Price of the good/service set by the 
firm, 
a  = Market potential  
l  = Quoted lead-time, 1b  
= Price sensitivity of demand, 
  = Mean arrival rate (demand), 2b  
= Lead-time sensitivity of demand, 
     = Mean service rate (Production 
capacity), 
   m  = Unit direct variable cost, 
   s  = Service level defined by company, 
   
KP  
= Probability of rejected customer, 
   K  = System capacity. 
 
In this formulation, constraint (6) imposes that the mean demand (λ) does not exceed the 
demand obtained with price (p) and quoted lead-time (l). Constraint (7) expresses the service level 
constraint. Constraint (9) calculates the probability of rejecting customers. Constraint (10) is the 
number of customers that are served and exit the system. Constraints (11) are the non-negativity 
constraints. 
Solving analytically this general case seems to be difficult. So, in the following section, we 
only consider the case of K = 1. We will consider two situations: the case without penalty and 
holding cost; and the case where these costs are included. In both cases, we will compare the 
obtained optimal solution with the optimal solution of the M/M/1 approach and derive insights. 
 
M/M/1/1 WITHOUT PENALTY COST AND HOLDING COST 
 
We consider here the case without holding and penalty costs. Thus, the objective function 
consists only in the maximization of the expected revenue. The Probability   lelWP  , hence 
implying that the service level constraint can be written as se
l  1 . Consequently, the 
formulation of the problem becomes: 
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 se
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Eq. (14) can be rewritten as   sl  11ln . Then, by integrating the equality constraint (eq. (15-
17)) into the objective function, we can simplify the formulation as: 
 
(P1’) 
pl ,,
Maximize

     mp   (19) 
 Subject to  lbpba 21   (20) 
   sl  11ln  (21) 
 0,, lp  (22) 
 
Using the new formulation (P1’) we will now transform the problem into a single variable 
optimization problem. Because of the space limitation, all the proofs are reported in Albana et al. 
(2016). Firstly, the demand constraint (eq. (20)) is binding at optimality, thus: lbpba 21 
   12 blbap   (Albana et al., 2016). Secondly, the service level constraint (eq. (21)) is 
also binding at optimality (Albana et al., 2016). Hence,    sl  11ln . We denote   s11ln  
by z, and get: zl  . Substitute zl   into the expression of p, we obtain: 
  12 bzbap   . Substituting p into the objective function, we get a new formulation of 
the problem with single variable (λ) as: 
 
(P1”)   









11
1
2
2
0
 Maximize
bb
bmzba
f




 (23) 
 
Proposition 1. There exists λ ≥ 0 such as   0f  iff m
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 (proof see Albana et al. 
(2016)). 
 
In order to find the optimal solution, we use the first derivative conditions. Indeed, 
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The numerator of eq. (24) must be equal to zero. It can be proven that the discriminant (Δ) of this 
numerator under condition of proposition 1 is greater or equal to 0. Hence eq. (24) has two real 
roots: 
 
 12
2
1 bmzba    and 12
2
2 bmzba    (25) 
 
Given that λ1 is negative, there is only one feasible stationary point λ2. Under proposition 1, λ2 is 
positive. It can also be shown that the objective function is a concave function in λ,l,p ≥ 0 (Albana 
et al., 2016). Hence, λ2 is also the optimum point. This leads to the results presented in proposition 
2. 
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Proposition 2. For problem P1, the optimum demand is 12
2* bmzba   with 
  sz  11ln , the optimum lead-time    sl  11ln* , the optimum price 
  1**2* blbap  , and the optimum profit =     mp  ***  . 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN M/M/1/1 AND M/M/1 WITHOUT HOLDING 
AND PENALTY COST 
 
In this section, we compare our model (M/M/1/1) with the existing M/M/1 taken from Pekgün 
et al. (2008) as they don’t consider holding and penalty costs. We use a base case with parameters: 
b1 = 4; μ = 10; s = 0.95; m = 5. We vary the market potential (a) and the lead-time sensitivity (b2). 
For each pair of value (a, b2), we calculate the relative gain obtained by using M/M/1/1 instead of 
M/M/1 . This relative gain is calculated as follows: 
 
 %100
Profit
ProfitProfit
M/M/1
M/M/1M/M/1/1


 (26) 
 
A positive value means that the approach with rejections (M/M/1/1 model) is better than the 
approach without rejections (M/M/1 model). 
 
Table 1 - Comparison for different values of a and b2 
b2 M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
20 40.87% 17.94% 8.29% 3.42% 0.66% 
19 37.10% 15.27% 6.12% 1.57% -0.99% 
18 33.39% 12.61% 3.96% -0.30% -2.65% 
17 29.73% 9.96% 1.79% -2.18% -4.33% 
16 26.13% 7.31% -0.40% -4.07% -6.03% 
15 22.57% 4.66% -2.59% -5.99% -7.74% 
14 19.05% 2.01% -4.80% -7.92% -9.48% 
13 15.57% -0.65% -7.03% -9.87% -11.24% 
12 12.11% -3.32% -9.29% -11.86% -13.04% 
11 8.68% -6.02% -11.57% -13.88% -14.87% 
10 5.26% -8.74% -13.90% -15.94% -16.74% 
9 1.85% -11.49% -16.28% -18.06% -18.67% 
8 -1.56% -14.30% -18.71% -20.23% -20.65% 
7 -4.98% -17.17% -21.22% -22.48% -22.71% 
6 -8.43% -20.13% -23.83% -24.83% -24.86% 
5 -11.92% -23.20% -26.56% -27.30% -27.14% 
 
30 40 50 60 70 
a 
 
We can see in table 1 that the rejection policy can be better than the all-customers acceptance 
policy, in particular when the market potential is small and the lead-time sensitivity is high. 
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Thus, the client rejection policy can be better in some cases even when the penalty and holding 
costs are removed. This motivates the purpose of next section where we will study the case with 
penalty and holding costs  
 
M/M/1/1 WITH PENALTY COST AND HOLDING COST 
 
With the addition of penalty and holding costs, the objective function includes the expected 
revenue, the total congestion costs, and the total lateness penalty costs. The formulation of this 
objective function has been presented earlier. The service level constraint is similar to the previous 
case. Thus, the formulation of the problem is: 
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Integrating the equality constraints (eq. (30 – 32)) to the objective function and rewriting 
1 le s   as   sl  11ln , we get the following formulation of the problem: 
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It can be shown that the demand constraint (eq. (35)) is binding at optimality (Albana et al., 2016). 
Thus, the formulation becomes: 
 
(P2”) 
l
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,
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 , 0l p   (40) 
 
In addition, there is also a feasibility condition of this problem as explained in proposition 3. 
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Proposition 3. The problem P2” is feasible (λ,l ≥ 0 and profit ≥ 0) iff m
b
lba


1
2  and 
01112 
 lecbFbmblba   (proof see Albana et al. (2016)). 
 
Unlike the first case where the penalty and holding costs are not considered, the service level 
constraint is not necessarily binding in this case, which complicates the solving approach. Indeed, 
for large values of  c, the actual service level has to be very high (close to 1) to avoid a high penalty 
cost. This indicates that the actual service level can be greater than the imposed service level (s). 
We now present the main steps to get the optimal solution given in proposition 4. The detailed 
proof is given in (Albana et al., 2016). 
To solve the problem, we apply the Lagrangian multiplier method. The stationary points of 
problem (P2”) must satisfy: 
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As we have already explained, we have two situations: 
(1) the service level constraint (39) is non-binding: css  ,  
(2) the service level constraint (39) is binding: css  , 
where the critical value for the service level (sc) equals to cbb 121 . With this critical service level 
(sc) we can prove that the actual service level is equal to  cssMax ,  (Albana et al., 2016). 
 
  ssMaxe c
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  where,   21,11 bcbsMaxx   (42) 
 
To find the optimal demand, we derive eq. (41) by λ. 
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The numerator of eq. (43) should be equal to zero. It is proven that, with the feasibility condition, 
the discriminant (Δ) of eq. (43) is positive (Albana et al., 2016). Hence eq. (43) has two roots 
which are: 
 
 1
lcebFbmblba   1112
2  and 
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2
lcebFbmblba   1112
2  (44) 
 
λ1 is negative. Under feasibility condition of proposition 3, λ2 is positive. It is proven that the 
objective is concave function for λ,l,p ≥ 0 (Albana et al., 2016). Thus, the lead-time (l*) and demand 
(λ2) provide the optimal solution. As a summary, the optimum point of this problem is given in the 
proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4. For problem P2: 
1. The optimum lead-time xl ln*   with   21,11 bcbsMaxx  . 
2. The optimum demand can be found by using equation
*
111
*
2
2* lcebFbmblba   , the optimum price   1**2* blbap  . 
3. The optimum profit    *** *     lceFmp . 
 
Based on the result found in this section, we will investigate whether our M/M/1/1 model with 
penalty and holding costs can be better than the M/M/1 model of Palaka et al. (1998). 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN M/M/1/1 AND M/M/1 WITH HOLDING AND 
PENALTY COST 
 
In this section, we compare our model (M/M/1/1) with the existing M/M/1 taken from Palaka 
et al. (1998). We vary the market potential (a) and the lead-time sensitivity (b2) (see Table 2). For 
each pair of value (a, b2), we calculate the relative gain obtained by using M/M/1/1 instead of 
M/M/1. This relative value follows equation (26). We use the same base case as in the previous 
comparison with additions of F = 2 and c = 10. 
As expected, we have more cases where M/M/1/1 is better than M/M/1 in this situation with 
penalty and holding costs compared to the situation without holding and penalty costs. In the 
M/M/1, because all clients are accepted, the lead-time can be very long which can cause high 
congestion costs. As b2 increases, the demand becomes more sensitive to lead-time, which favors 
the rejection policy modeled by the M/M/1/1. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have provided the general formulation of M/M/1/K with penalty and holding costs where 
demand is sensitive to both price and lead-time. We solved analytically the case with K=1 in two 
situations: with and without penalty and holding costs. We conducted numerical experiments based 
on the analytical solutions and showed that the rejection policy (M/M/1/1) can be better than the 
all-customers acceptance policy (M/M/1). This paper can be extended in many ways such as 
considering the case of K>1 or modeling a system of type M/D/1. We are currently working on 
these issues. 
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Table 2 - Comparison for different values of a and b2 
b2 M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
20 53.96% 26.95% 15.50% 9.58% 6.11% 
19 49.95% 24.23% 13.33% 7.74% 4.49% 
18 46.02% 21.53% 11.17% 5.90% 2.86% 
17 42.16% 18.84% 9.02% 4.05% 1.22% 
16 38.37% 16.17% 6.86% 2.19% -0.43% 
15 34.64% 13.51% 4.69% 0.33% -2.09% 
14 30.96% 10.85% 2.52% -1.54% -3.76% 
13 27.34% 8.20% 0.34% -3.43% -5.45% 
12 23.77% 5.56% -1.85% -5.34% -7.16% 
11 20.24% 2.91% -4.05% -7.26% -8.89% 
10 16.74% 0.25% -6.27% -9.21% -10.65% 
9 13.28% -2.42% -8.52% -11.19% -12.43% 
8 9.84% -5.10% -10.80% -13.19% -14.25% 
7 6.42% -7.81% -13.11% -15.24% -16.10% 
6 3.01% -10.56% -15.47% -17.33% -18.01% 
5 -0.40% -13.35% -17.88% -19.49% -19.97% 
 
30 40 50 60 70 
a 
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